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Parental Liability for the Antitrust Infringements of 
Subsidiaries: A Rebuttable Presumption or Probatio Diabolica?
(Arkema SA  European Commission, ECJ (Second Chamber), Judgment of 
29 September 2011, C-520/09 P; and Elf Aquitaine SA  European Commission, 
ECJ (Second Chamber), Judgment of 29 September 2011, C-521/09 P)
The ECJ judgments delivered in Arkema and Elf 
Aquitaine further develop the rules on application
of the shareholding-based presumption which
allows the Commission to impute to the parent 
companies liability for antitrust infringements com-
mitted by their subsidiaries. The ECJ reafﬁrms the
rebuttable nature of the presumption and empha-
sises the need to conduct a detailed assessment of 
the parties’ arguments presented for the rebuttal 
of the above presumption. It remains to be seen
what evidence the parties will need to present in
order to succeed in rebutting the presumption.
(1) Facts and Procedure
On 19 January 2005 the Commission issued its
infringement Decision1 against Akzo Nobel NV, 
Akzo Nobel Nederland BV, Akzo Nobel Chemicals 
BV, Akzo Nobel Functional Chemicals BV, Akzo 
Nobel Base Chemicals AB, Eka Chemicals AB, Akzo
Nobel AB, Clariant AG, Clariant GmbH, Elf Aqui-
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taine SA, Arkema SA (formerly known as Atoﬁna
SA), and Hoechst AG, which established that the
speciﬁed undertakings participated in a single  
and continuous infringement of Article
101 TFEU (ex Article 81 EC) from at least 1 
January 1984 to 7 May 1999 on the market
for monochloroacetic acid (MCAA). The anticom-
petitive practices of the cartelists consisted of al-
locating customers and volume quotas, concert-
ed price increases, establishing a compen sation 
mechanism to ensure the implementation of quo-
tas, and the exchange of sales volumes and pric-
es. Taking into account that Elf Aquitaine held
98% of the shares in Arkema, the Commis-
sion jointly ﬁned the companies EUR 45  million. As 
Arkema had been the addressee of another Article 
101 TFEU (ex Article 81 EC) decision,2 it was given
an additional ﬁ ne of EUR 13,5 million.
On 25 April 2005, Arkema brought an action
for the annulment of the Commission’s De-
cision before the General Court (GC). It claimed 
inter alia that the Commission had failed to ob-
serve the rules governing imputability to a parent
company of the practices of its subsidiary; that 
the principle of the subsidiary’s legal and com-
mercial independence had been infringed by the 
presumption of the parent company’s decisive in-
ﬂ uence on the subsidiary’s conduct; and that the
principle of personal liability had been infringed. 
The GC dismissed the claims.3 The GC stated that
earlier case-law4 had established a rebuttable
presumption that where the parent company 
owns 100% of the subsidiary, in the absence of
sufﬁ cient evidence to the contrary, it can be pre-
sumed that the parent company exercises a de-
cisive influence over the affiliate’s com-
mercial policy.5 The GC considered that «[i]n
the context of a group of companies, a holding 
company that coordinates ﬁnancial investments 
within the group is in a position to regroup share-
holdings in various companies and has the func-
tion of ensuring that they are run as one, including 
by means of such budgetary control».6
Arkema appealed. It argued that by deﬁ ning the
function of the holding company in this way the 
GC had, in fact, made the imputability pre-
sumption irrebutable because any attempt 
to prove that the subsidiary acted independently 
would run counter to the very function of the hold-
ing (parent company) as deﬁned. In his Opinion,
Advocate General Mengozzi disagreed with 
Arkema and contended that «the function which 
the GC recognizes that a non-operational holding 
company has of running the group companies as
one does not necessarily entail interference in the
commercial policy of its subsidiaries».7 According
to the Advocate General, it will always be open
to the parent company or its subsidiaries to rebut
the presumption based on the controlling share-
holding and to prove that the abovementioned
function of the holding company was not actual-
ly exercised.8 Following the GC’s reasoning, «the
parties concerned are not required to adduce di-
rect and irrefutable evidence of the independ-
ence of the subsidiary’s conduct on the market 
but only to submit evidence capable of demon-
strating that independence ... Moreover, the fact 
that in the present case the applicant did not sub-
mit evidence to rebut the presumption of the ab-
sence of independence does not mean that that
presumption cannot under any circum stances be
rebutted».9 AG Mengozzi noted that the GC had
examined various pieces of evidence presented by 
Arkema, including Elf Aquitaine’s status as a non-
operational holding, the submission that Arkema 
had never implemented the reporting policy, that 
MCAA activity within the Elf Aquitaine group was
minor and the fact that Arkema and its parent 
company operated in separate markets and did 
not supply the same customers. In the light of the 
above considerations AG Mengozzi advised the 
ECJ to dismiss Arkema’s appeal.
On 27 April 2005 Elf Aquitaine lodged a
parallel appeal against the Commission’s
Decision before the GC.10 In support of its claim
Elf Aquitaine contended that the contested Deci-
sion had been inadequately reasoned. Firstly, Elf 
Aquitaine submitted that the Commission had im-
puted liability for actions of the subsidiary on the 
sole basis of the 100% shareholding and without 
additional reasoning had found the documents 
providing an overview of business management
insufﬁcient to rebut the above presumption.11
Secondly, Elf Aquitaine contended that there had
been a failure to observe the rules governing im-
putability to a parent company arguing that the
Commission did not have discretion to establish
the burden of proof for imputability, but had to
take into account the circumstances of each par-
ticular case.12 Thirdly, Elf Aquitaine argued that
there had been a violation of the principle of per-
sonal liability for competition law infringements.13
Finally, Elf Aquitaine contended that there had
been a breach of the principle of good adminis-
tration by resorting to the shareholding presump-
tion without conducting a detailed investigation
into the facts of the present case14.
The GC held that since almost all of Arkema’s cap-
ital was owned by Elf Aquitaine, the Commission
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could reasonably presume the lack of autonomy
on the part of the subsidiary and it was for Elf 
Aquitaine to produce the evidence to the
contrary.15 The GC held that the Commission 
was correct in dismissing the documents provid-
ing an overview of business management because 
they provided only a general image of the 
business management and were insuffi-
cient to rebut the above presumption.16
Elf Aquitaine appealed. Although the Court’s 
jurisprudence consistently stated that the share-
holding presumption is a «simple» rebuttable pre-
sumption, Elf Aquitaine contended that the pre-
sumption had become absolute or irre-
butable. Elf Aquitaine argued that the fact that
the shareholding alone was sufﬁcient for applica-
bility of the presumption;17 that the GC’s conﬁr-
mation of the Commission’s margin of discretion
in imputing the liability for the subsidiary’s con-
duct;18 and the GC’s assessment of the evidence 
presented by the applicant, all indicated that the 
presumption was in fact absolute.19 In relation to 
the last condition Elf Aquitaine argued that by 
requiring the negative proof concerning the ab-
sence of the parent company’s inﬂuence on the 
subsidiary’s conduct the GC has created a sort of 
probatio diabolica, which was inconsistent with
the effective judicial review and the right for ac-
cess to justice. Elf Aquitaine also submitted that
the GC has thus created an inadmissible inequal-
ity between the applicant, who had to satisfy this 
probatio diabolica and the Commission, which 
could make use of the imputability presumption
and enjoyed the discretion whether to apply it 
or not. According the applicant the criteria laid
down in Akzo Nobel including organisational, 
economic and legal links between the parent and 
its subsidiary20 had to be viewed by the GC as a
whole, rather than assessing each piece of evi-
dence in isolation. 
Addressing the applicant’s arguments concerning 
the compatibility of the shareholding-based pre-
sumption with the principles of sufﬁcient reasoning 
and impartial investigation AG  Mengozzi consid-
ered that the argument that the use of a presump-
tion was inconsistent with the requirements of an 
impartial investigation – by allowing the Commis-
sion not to search for additional evidence – would 
mean, in principle, the denial of the very admissi-
bility of presumptions.21 The AG Mengozzi recalled 
that the admissibility of the shareholding-based 
presumption has been repeatedly conﬁrmed in
the ECJ’s jurisprudence.22 As in ICI, the majority
shareholding in a subsidiary provided the parent 
company the possibility to inﬂuence the conduct 
of the subsidiary and, in the absence of the evi-
dence to the contrary, it was legitimate to assume 
that such inﬂ uence was exercised, and that the 
subsidiary did not act independently.23 It was also 
conﬁ rmed in Stora that the imputability of con-
duct was not based solely on the 100% share-
holding, but a combination of this and the ab-
sence of the evidence that the subsidiary has acted 
independently.24 AG Mengozzi concluded that a 
presumption remained admissible as long as
it was possible in «reasonable limits» to sub-
mit the evidence to the contrary.25 Hence, in AG 
Mengozzi’s view, the GC has not established any 
standards of proof in this regard, but merely ex-
amined the evidence presented by the applicant 
and found it insufﬁ cient to rebut the presumption. 
In relation to the margin of discretion exercised by 
the Commission, AG Mengozzi noted that this dis-
cretion related solely to the Commission’s decision
whether to sanction the parent company for the
actions of subsidiary where the conditions for im-
putability have already been met.
(2) Judgment
In its assessment of the rules applicable to the im-
putability of conduct the ECJ relied on its earlier
case-law, where it had held that «where a par-
ent company has a 100% shareholding in a sub-
sidiary which has infringed the competition rules 
of the European Union, ﬁ rst, the parent company 
can exercise a decisive inﬂ uence on the conduct
of the subsidiary and, second, there is a rebuttable 
presumption that the parent company does in fact
exercise such a decisive inﬂuence».26 Therefore, «it
is sufﬁ cient for the Commission to prove that the
subsidiary is wholly owned by the parent compa-
ny in order to presume that the parent company 
exercised a decisive inﬂuence over the commer-
cial policy of the subsidiary».27 The ECJ empha-
sised that the shareholding-based presump-
tion was capable of being overturned and 
the GC’s observation on the function of the hold-
ing company concerned primarily the merits of 
the evidence adduced by Arkema (that Elf Aqui-
taine was merely a non-operational holding com-
pany that rarely intervened in the management of
its subsidiaries). In the ECJ’s interpretation of the 
GC’s reasoning, it was not sufficient to claim 
that the parent company was non-oper-
ational in order to rebut the presumption.28 The 
ECJ therefore rejected Arkema’s assertion that the
GC had applied an irrebutable presumption.29
The ECJ also conﬁrmed the admissibility of share-
holding-based imputability presumption in its Elf 
Aquitaine judgment.30 The ECJ noted that this pre-
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sumption was based on the fact that, except in 
very exceptional circumstances, the parent com-
pany holding the whole of the subsidiary’s capi-
tal can exercise a decisive inﬂ uence on the sub-
sidiary’s conduct and that evidence that such in-
ﬂ uence was not effectively exercised can be best
located within the companies against whom such
presumption is invoked.31 In line with AG Men-
gozzi’s Opinion, the ECJ rejected the applicant’s
assertion that the GC created a probatio diaboli-
ca and that the presumption was irrebutable. The
ECJ held that the mere fact that an entity did not 
produce sufﬁcient evidence to rebut it or that it
might be difﬁcult to produce such evidence could
not lead to the conclusion that such presumption
was absolute. This was especially so since the un-
dertakings concerned were in the best position
to locate such evidence.32 Thus, once prima fa-
cie evidence allows the application of the imput-
ability presumption, the Commission was under 
no obligation to produce any additional evidence
showing the lack of autonomy on the part of the 
wholly-owned subsidiary.33
However, the ECJ disagreed with AG Mengozzi
in assessing whether the Commission’s reasoning
was sufﬁcient to meet its obligations to state
reasons for its decision pursuant to Article 296
TFEU (ex Article 253 EC). In case of an infringe-
ment decision, the duty to state reasons would 
be satisﬁed if the addressees of that decision can 
comprehend the grounds for imputability.34 The 
ECJ noted inter alia that in order to rebut the im-
putability presumption the applicant had adduced
particular arguments related to the organisation-
al, economic and legal links between Elf Aquitaine 
and Arkema. Under such circumstances the GC 
had to give particular attention as to whether the 
contested decision contained a detailed explana-
tion as to whether the adduced arguments (that
Elf Aquitaine was nothing more than a non-op-
erational holding company; that Arkema’s com-
mercial conduct was not carried out pursuant 
to Elf Aquitaine’s instructions; that Elf Aquitaine 
was not informed about Arkema’s conduct on the 
relevant market; that Arkema was authorised to 
conclude contracts without prior authorisation
of the parent company; that Arkema enjoyed ﬁ-
nancial autonomy from Elf Aquitaine; and that
Arkema had always determined its legal strate-
gy by itself)35 were insufﬁ cient to rebut the im-
putability presumption.36 The mere statement 
that such arguments were insufficient to 
rebut the presumption made it difﬁcult, if
not impossible, to determine whether the Com-
mission found these arguments unconvincing or
whether the Commission considered Elf Aqui-
taine’s 98% shareholding in Arkema sufﬁcient
for imputability to apply regardless of arguments
raised in rebuttal.37 On that basis the ECJ conclud-
ed that the GC has committed an error in law by
holding that the contested decision was in con-
formity with Article 296 TFEU.38 The ECJ therefore 
annulled the GC’s judgment and the part of
the Commission’s Decision imputing liability to Elf
Aquitaine.
(3) Comment
The Arkema and Elf Aquitaine judgments have re-
afﬁrmed the admissibility of the imputability pre-
sumption based on a controlling shareholding. 
These cases reaffirm the rebuttable nature 
of the presumption and emphasise the need 
for the Commission to provide adequate reason-
ing so that the addressees are able to ascertain the
reasons why certain evidence was considered in-
sufﬁ cient for the rebuttal of the presumption. The
Court made it clear that «all the relevant factors 
related to the economic, organisational, and legal 
links which exist between [the subsidiary] and the
company in the same group which is considered
to be responsible for the actions of that group» 
must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.39 In
this sense, mere assumptions or negations without
substantive assessment of the evidence adduced 
by the parties would be insufﬁcient to explain the 
Commission’s reasoning to the addressees of its 
decision. Moreover, it would not sufﬁ ce to pro-
vide the Court with the adequate substance for 
judicial review.
In other words the Court has preserved the
potential to rebut the presumption, and 
the usage of presumptions in general.40 Arkema
and Elf Aquitaine have also preserved another, 
procedural function of the presumption: that it is 
the applicant that has to bear the burden of proof
in making its case against an established presump-
tion. While conﬁrming the general admissibility of 
the shareholding-based presumption, the Court
emphasised that once the parties have produced
evidence aimed at demonstrating the absence of
the decisive parental inﬂuence on the subsidiary’s
conduct, it was for the Commission to ex-
plain why such evidence would be insuf-
ficient to rebut the presumption.
It is notable that the ECJ’s rulings in Elf Aquitaine
and Arkema have followed the recent string
of judgments delivered by the GC where
the application of the presumption of parental li-
ability was quashed by the Court on procedural 
grounds.41 For instance, in Grolsch the GC held
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that the Commission had failed to state the rea-
sons why it considered that the subsidiary’s con-
duct should be attributed to the parent compa-
ny.42 By failing to state the requisite Akzo Nobel’s
«economic, organizational, and legal links» that
would justify imputability of conduct, the Com-
mission had effectively denied Grolsch the oppor-
tunity to rebut the presumption concerning the
exercise of a decisive inﬂ uence over its 100% sub-
sidiary.43 In General Quimica the ECJ provided an 
example of how the rebuttal arguments should 
be analysed by the Commission and the GC, al-
though eventually reaching the same conclusion 
as the GC.44 In another case, Gosselin Group, the 
applicants adduced evidence concerning internal
decision-making within the group, which demon-
strated that at the time of the infringement the 
parent company did not have the possibility of ex-
ercising a decisive inﬂuence over the subsidiary’s
commercial policies, which was viewed by the GC
as sufﬁ cient to rebut the shareholding-based pre-
sumption.45 While the admissibility of the share-
holding-based presumption has been conﬁrmed in 
these cases, the next step for the Commission and 
the Court will be the development of a coherent 
assessment practice as to what types of evidence 
can be brought in order to successfully rebut the 
imputability presumption. 
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